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From Reaction to Agency: A ‘Subaltern’
Response to William Twining’s
Globalisation and Legal Scholarship
Basil Ugochukwu*

Abstract
In this essay, it is contended that by welcoming a cosmopolitan discipline of law that encompasses
‘all levels of social relations and legal orderings’ (both dominant and peripheral) as well as by
suggesting that the intellectual heritage of Western jurisprudence be adapted ‘to the new predicament of global law’, William Twining offers a platform to the world’s marginalised legal systems
and formations to assert their relevance in the advancement of legal theory. In developing this
argument, I will first examine what opportunities exist within Twining’s theorising to reclaim and
de-marginalise non-Western understandings of the law and its social value within the context of
pluralism and globalisation. Secondly, I discuss what could be the lessons and implications of his
proposals for a globalised legal theory on legal education and scholarship in the less dominant or
‘subaltern’ legal systems. I also suggest how scholars from subaltern territories could effectively
insert their voices in the diversification and pluralisation of global legal theory.

1. INTRODUCTION
Legal scholars from the Global South reading William Twining’s Globalisation and Legal
Scholarship1 for the first time will find it interesting on many levels. For a start, it builds
upon his work on the broader subject of what he terms ‘general jurisprudence’.2 Twining’s general jurisprudence would seem to be a departure from the often atomised and
insular treatment of the subject in dominant legal thought that is driven mostly by EuroAmerican traditions. It also confirms a variety of canons on the relationship between
*

1
2

PhD candidate and Legal Process Instructor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Canada.
The author is grateful to Professor Peer Zumbansen for his encouragement and to the two anonymous
reviewers at TLT for their comments and suggestions. Email: ugochukwubc@gmail.com. All websites
accessed April 2013.
William Twining, Globalisation and Legal Scholarship (Wolf Legal Publishers, 2011).
William Twining, General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective (Cambridge
University Press, 2009).
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what could be called subaltern legal formations and liberal—and what is sometimes
described as parochial3 —legal theory.
I do not use the subaltern concept in the context of a political category. I rather use
it in a legal geographical sense as bringing within its ambit those discreet, marginalised,
non-Western legal regimes and systems prevalent in different regions of what is
commonly known as the ‘Global South’. The ‘subaltern’ I have in mind here is the category
of legal systems and formations that could parallel the poor and disempowered in a
political sense such that those legal systems are consigned to the margins and periphery
of legal/cultural discourse. I mean the legal systems of ‘the Ancient World, the Orient,4
the Primitive World, the Third World, the Underdeveloped World, the Developing
World and now the Global South’.5 I also have in mind the legal systems of ‘poorer and
less technologically advanced societies’ in contrast to their ‘liberal, well-ordered’ or
‘hierarchical’ counterparts.6
This essay uses sub-Saharan Africa as an exemplar of the subaltern society that is
herein suggested. While I illustrate my argument mostly by reference to that region,
this should not be taken to suggest that there are monolithic subaltern or African legal
systems. My initial contention is that by welcoming a cosmopolitan discipline of law
which encompasses ‘all levels of social relations and legal orderings’7 (both dominant
and peripheral), as well as by suggesting that the intellectual heritage of Western
jurisprudence be adapted ‘to the new predicament of global law’8 , Twining offers a
platform to these apparently fringe legal systems and formations to assert their relevance
in a world in which globalisation is fuelling debates about pluralism in normative legal
orders at the domestic and international fronts.
This intervention supports the proposition that what seems to have normalised as a
scholarship of reaction animating much of the Global South’s discourse on the uses and
abuses of liberal jurisprudence and legal theory would not be enough under a globalised
context to represent Southern, or for that matter other subaltern (peripheral),9 voices in
this debate. What I intend to do in this contribution is examine the potential opportunities
that exist within Twining’s theorising, to reclaim and de-marginalise non-Western
understandings of the law and its social value within the context of globalisation. Second,
I will briefly discuss what could be the implications of his proposals for globalised legal
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Ibid, 10.
See Edward Said, Orientalism (Vintage, 1978).
Jean Comaroff and John L Comaroff, ‘Theory from the South: Or, How Euro-America is Evolving toward
Africa’ (2012) 22 Anthropological Forum 113.
John Rawls, ‘The Law of Peoples’ (1993) 20 Critical Inquiry 44.
Twining (n 1) 9.
Ibid.
Giovanni Marini, ‘Forward: Legal Traditions: A Critical Appraisal’ (2011) 2 Comparative Law Review 1; see
also Mark Toufayan, ‘When British Justice (in African Colonies) Points Two Ways: On Dualism, Hybridity,
and the Genealogy of Juridical Negritude in Taslim Olawale Elias’ (2008) 21 Leiden Journal of International
Law 377.
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theory on legal education and scholarship in the Global South generally and Africa more
specifically.

2. THE COMPLEX FIELD OF LEGAL THEORY
Before considering Twining’s specific insights which are central to my intervention, it
is important to take a look, however cursory, at the general field of jurisprudence and
legal theory, as this will enable a clearer understanding of the novel ideas he is bringing
to the field. In doing so, I will look at two different strands of scholarship that tend to
perceive both complex and dichotomous tendencies in legal theory. Michael Giudice
identifies ‘diverse cohabitants’ associated with legal theory including moral, political,
or normative, descriptive-explanatory, and social scientific theorists of various kinds.10
Notwithstanding their numbers, Giudice collapses these competing paradigms into two
distinct categories: participant/internal and nonparticipant/external theorists. While the
former is positivistic and takes on board the ideas of famous thinkers like HLA Hart
(conceptual analysis) and Hans Kelsen (pure theory), the latter is more empirical and
accommodates such legal scholars as Richard Posner (social scientific and socioeconomic legal theory).11 While positivism theorises that law can only be understood in
terms of its own ‘internal dynamic’,12 empirical (or critical, if you like) thinkers assert
that ‘a complex interplay of causes and effects’13 is essential to the understanding of law.
This would seem to indicate that Jeremy Bentham’s earlier effort to ‘construct a
jurisprudence that applied around the world’, a project which his disciple John Austin
also called ‘general [or universal]14 jurisprudence’ or legal science, was a futile one.15 It
failed apparently for two major reasons. First, it drew heavily on the positivist tradition16
described above, and second, it was ambiguous in its failure to account for the distinction
10
11
12

13

14
15

16

Michael Giudice, ‘Ways of Understanding Diversity among Theories of Law’ (2005) 24 Law and Philosophy
509.
Ibid, 510.
Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field’ (1987) 38 Hastings Law Journal
814; Harold J Spaeth, ‘The Attitudinal Model’ in Lee Epstein (ed), Contemplating Courts (Congressional
Quarterly Inc, 1995) 296; Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (Anchor, 1963) 33.
Giudice (n 10) 511; see also Richard Abel, ‘Law and Society: Project and Practice’ (2010) 6 Annual Review of
Law and Social Science 1; Mariana Valverde, ‘The Sociology of Law as a Means against Struggle itself ’ (2006)
15 Social and Legal Studies 591; Allan Hutchinson, ‘Judges and Politics: An Essay from Canada” (2004) 24
Legal Studies 275.
See Philip Schofield, ‘Jeremy Bentham and Nineteenth-Century English Jurisprudence’ (1991) 12 Journal
of History 59.
Brian Z Tamanaha, ‘What is “General” Jurisprudence? A Critique of Universalist Claims by Philosophical
Concepts of Law’ Transnational Legal Theory, forthcoming, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2018283.
In fact to Austin ‘General Jurisprudence’ was the same as ‘the Philosophy of Positive Law’. See Roger
Berkowitz, ‘From Justice to Justification: An Alternative Genealogy of Positive Law’ (2011) 1 University of
California Irvine Law Review 611.
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between the ‘general’ and ‘particular’ in Bentham’s thinking about law.17 This in turn,
according to Tamanaha, gave impetus to two distinct approaches to conceptualising
general jurisprudence separate from how Bentham and Austin formulated it. These
approaches are far more relevant to Twining’s project than the sum of all the previous
complexities I have traced up to this time.
Of these two approaches, one is dominant and holds that ‘the central task of general
jurisprudence is to produce a universally applicable theory of the nature of law’.18 The
second approach is not concerned with a single ‘theory of the nature of law … but rather
on constructing a theoretical framework that addresses various manifestations of law
around the globe’.19 Significantly, rather than the insular and generally imperialistic
peculiarity of the first approach, the tack of the second ‘brings within its compass state
law, international law, transnational law, religious law, human rights law, customary
law, and other instantiations of law’.20 Tamanaha specifically situates Twining’s idea of
general jurisprudence within this paradigm.21
Considered against this background, it is clear that no general understanding of what
the law is has ever been constructed.22 Theorists on the various sides of the debate often
claimed priority for their methodological preferences and ascribed better grounding to
their theoretical insights. This led to what has been termed ‘imperialism’ in legal theory.
But imperialism here is described as the claim of ‘supremacy for a particular approach,
as the only or most important way to a true or accurate understanding of law’.23 Yet this
form of ‘imperialism’ only gave expression to a methodological turf war among theorists
who all belong to a dominant Euro-American or Western tradition in legal theory. In this
turf war, non-Western understandings of law, however rudimentary or undeveloped,24
were completely excluded in what obviously is a different kind of imperialism, to which
I now turn.

17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24

Tamanaha (n 15) 1.
Ibid, 2; see also Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason
(Oxford University Press, 2009) 91.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Bryan S Turner and Berna Zengin Arslan, ‘Shari’a and Legal Pluralism in the West’ (2011) 14 European
Journal of Social Theory 142; Kenneth Ehrenberg, ‘Law is Not (best considered) an Essentially Contested
Concept’ (2011) 7 International Journal of Law in Context 209.
Giudice (n 10) 510.
Brett Shadle, ‘Changing Traditions to Meet Current Altering Conditions: Customary Law, African Courts
and the Rejection of Codification in Kenya, 1930–60’ (1999) 40 Journal of African History 411; Martin
Chanock, ‘Neither Customary Nor Legal: African Customary Law in an Era of Family Law Reform’ (1989)
3 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 72; Sally Falk Moore, ‘Treating Law as Knowledge:
Telling Colonial Officers what to Say to Africans about Running “Their Own” Native Courts’ (1992) 26 Law
and Society Review 11; Basil Ugochukwu, ‘Unpacking the Universal: African Human Rights Philosophy in
Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart’ in Oche Onazi (ed), African Legal Theory and Contemporary Problems:
Critical Essays (Springer, forthcoming); Andrew Harding, ‘Global Doctrine and Local Knowledge: Law in
South East Asia’ (2002) 51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 35.
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3. TWINING, THE SUBALTERN AND GLOBALISED LEGAL THEORY
In canvassing his ideas about how the phenomenon of globalisation should inform current legal thought, Twining recognises the divide between the dominant Euro-American
traditions and subaltern/marginalised ones. It is for this very reason that his argument
should appeal to proponents of subaltern legal traditions. Twining’s contribution is
clearly poised against the variant of legal imperialism which excludes non-Western conceptions of law from legal theory. He calls for a more global/pluralistic view of law and
not just its conception as framed by dominant and hegemonistic Western thoughts, ideas
and institutions.
In developing and situating his contribution within the pluralism/globalisation
debate, Twining first notes the diffusion, reception and transplantation of legal traditions
across jurisdictions, also acknowledging that imperialism and colonialism are factors
that to a great degree accounted for this diffusion. ‘Law spreads with Empire,’ he states.25
Consequently, Twining asserts that the law of the modern state is but an exclusive
creation of European and Anglo-American legal traditions, which has ‘spread through
nearly all the world via colonialism, imperialism, trade and more recent neo-colonial
influences’.26 Just as significantly, in most postcolonial subaltern states questions persist
as to the suitability of the imposed legal traditions in dealing with social issues that are
context-specific in institutional and cultural terms.
What this makes clear is that imposing a particular legal system (complete with
the theoretical ideas that undergird it) on a colonised territory is no guarantee that the
imposed system and theory will achieve anywhere near the same results in the colonised
territory as in the territory of the imposing power.27 This is an important lesson in the
spread of dominant legal theory and traditions through colonialism and imperialism. In
Africa specifically, liberal construction of law that is removed from time, social context
and historical circumstance has not fulfilled the ambition of social engineering.28 The
Twining (n 1) 27; see also Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History,
1400–1900 (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 127; Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony (University of
California Press, 2001) 25; Anthony Anghie, ‘Colonial Origins of International Law’ in Eve Darian-Smith
and Peter Fitzpatrick (eds), Laws of the Postcolonial (University of Michigan Press, 1999); Helen Marshall
Carter, ‘Prospects for the Administration of Justice in Nigeria: Courts, Police, and Politics’ (1981) 11 Issue:
A Journal of Opinion 29 (‘… British set out in the next century to paint the rest of the world red, and Africa
offered a particularly tempting expanse of apparently blank canvas. Here courts on the English model
appeared along the leading edge of colonial intrusion, often as the first institutions to impinge upon the
local cultures’). On the subject of human rights, see Samuel Moyn, ‘Imperialism, Self-Determination, and
the Rise of Human Rights’ in Akira Iriye, Petra Goedde and William Hitchcock (eds), The Human Rights
Revolution: An International History (Oxford University Press, 2012) 162.
26 Twining (n 1) 50.
27 This has been described as the theory of two cultures which comprises the culture of origin of the legal
system and the culture of the system into which it is transplanted or imposed. See Richard Small, ‘Towards
a Theory of Contextual Transplants’ (2005) 19 Emory International Law Review 1431.
28 Ronald Olufemi Badru, ‘Rethinking the Colonial Legacy in the Legal Reasoning of the Contemporary
African State: An Argument from African Metaphysical Epistemology’, http://umconference.um.edu.my/
upload/43-1/papers/016%20BadruRonaldOlufemi.pdf.
25
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proper place of law in society (especially the major questions of what law, for what society,
through which sources) is therefore still very much unsettled in those environments.
It has been rightly argued that the failure of imposed law in the post-colony could be
a result of the theoretical reasoning that undergirded it. An example of this failure could
be in the area of crime prevention and punishment of which I use the African context
again for illustration. The claim is that the Western mode of legal reasoning which is still
dominant in the current African systems of legal justice has been largely ineffective in
dealing with what is described as ‘metaphysically induced criminalities and other forms
of covert wrong doing which are now rampant in the modern African society’.29 It was
therefore recommended that a ‘methodology of African metaphysical epistemology30 be
adopted to complement the Western mode of legal reasoning in order to enhance truth
finding … before legal justice is dispensed’.31
Ideas similar to this, as well as the impact of globalisation and the turn to legal
pluralism, have sharpened the edges of these inquiries, and Twining is very much aware
of this fact. As such, rather than dissentions over theoretical paradigms in a normatively
liberal and conceptually unitary legal field, he guides the debate towards the recognition
of differences and diversity in the range of peoples subject to the law as well as the
existence of plurality in the normative sources of law. Twining says law is ‘a participantoriented discipline largely concerned with the details of immediate, practical, local
problems’.32 He is keenly aware that ‘globalisation may lead to legal scholarship and
education becoming detached from its roots in a particular legal tradition and local legal
practice’ and that this could be a danger.33 Nevertheless, therein also lies the opportunity
to realise the hopes of global legal diversity or pluralism. He argues that ‘legal practice
in a multi-cultural society needs to some extent to be multicultural’.34 Though his use
of ‘legal practice’ in this statement might suggest a narrower, profession-related idea, I
would see it as incorporating the theory within which the practice is embedded as well.

4. HARTIAN POSITIVISM AND THE MARGINALISATION OF CUSTOM
An integral part of the colonial project was the delegitimation and marginalisation of
‘native’ legal systems and processes.35 To justify colonialism and advance its goals, it was
29
30

31
32
33
34
35

Ibid.
An ‘African epistemology’ encompasses, according to the author, four basic ways of knowing: divination,
revelation, intuition, and reason, each of which could fall into the categories of the supernatural, natural
and paranormal. Ibid, 13.
Ibid, 2.
Twining (n 1) 31.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ruth Buchanan, ‘Passing through the Mirror: Dead Man, Legal Pluralism and the De-Territorialization of
the West’ (2010) 7 Law, Culture and the Humanities 289; see also Rebecca Johnson, ‘Justice and the Colonial
Collision: Reflections on Stories of Intercultural Encounter in Law, Literature, Sculpture and Film’ (2012)
9 NoFo 69.
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paramount to first destroy legal theories and knowledge with the potential to support or
validate native social, legal and political systems and processes. For example, it is a settled
fact that African societies had been governed under customary law prior to colonisation.36 However, writing in 1961 at the time when decolonisation efforts were gathering
momentum in much of the colonised world, Hart posited that ‘[c]ustom is not in the
modern world a very important “source” of law … It is usually a subordinate one.’37
Besides Hart’s categorisation of the world’s major legal systems, Steven Vago, writing
from a plain law and society framework, completely erased customary law as one of
those systems.38
The major reason Hart advances as an explanation for custom’s inability to ground
positive legal norms is that ‘the legislature may by statute deprive a customary rule of
legal status’. He then mentions the predominant colonial practice of that period by
which, to be fit for legal recognition, customs were subjected to ‘tests’, including the test of
reasonableness.39 These tests would require, for example, that to be rendered applicable,
a rule of customary law shall ‘not be repugnant to justice and morality’ (in Kenya and
Malawi), not be ‘repugnant to natural justice and morality’ (in Southern Rhodesia), not
be ‘repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience’ (in Ghana, Nigeria and
Sierra Leone), or not be repugnant to ‘justice, morality or order’ (in Sudan).40
Hart’s obviously positivist de-coupling of the customary from the range of legitimate
sources of law relegated custom ‘to the nether world of qualifying adjectives and
unnatural synonyms: indigenous, imbricated, or informal law, systems of social control,
reglementation, normative systems, or folkways’.41 However, as argued throughout this
essay, in a majority of the colonised world, the positivist conception of law and society

36

37
38

39
40
41

Jeanmarie Fenrich, Paolo Galizzi and Tracy Higgins, ‘Introduction’ in Fenrich, Galizzi and Higgins (eds),
The Future of African Customary Law (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 1. ‘Customary Law’ in this
context should not be confused with ‘Customary International Law’. As used in this essay, customary law
has the same meaning as under section 11(3) of the Constitution of Ghana 1992, defined as ‘rules of law
which by custom are applicable to particular communities in Ghana’, or as in section 291 of the Nigerian
Evidence Act, Chapter 112 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990, as ‘rule which in a particular district has
from long usage obtained the force of law’. In Oyewunmi v Ogunsesan (1990) NWLR (Pt 137) 182 at 207
the Nigerian Supreme Court defined customary law as ‘the organic or living law of the indigenous people
of Nigeria regulating their lives and transactions’. See also ES Nwauche, ‘The Constitutional Challenge of
Integration and Interaction of Customary and the Received English Common Law in Nigeria and Ghana’
(2010) 25 Tulane European and Civil Law Forum 40.
HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 1961) 44.
Steven Vago, Law and Society (Pearson Prentice Hall, 2006) 12. While not recognised as a ‘legal system’,
customary law is nonetheless noted as falling into legal ‘tradition’ described as ‘Chthonic’ and marked by
a distinct character of ‘orality’. See H Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World (Oxford University Press,
2004) 61.
Hart (n 37) 44.
Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism
(Princeton University Press, 1996) 115.
HW Arthurs, Without the Law: Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth Century England
(University of Toronto Press, 1985) 3.
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could not be realised in actual behaviour because people did not just accept Hartian
formal laws as the primary basis for regulating their lives.42
Not surprisingly, ideas like Hart’s are often held accountable for the demise of the
‘divine, rational, and customary insights that grounded the traditional authority of
law’,43 whose earlier historical insights were canonised by the likes of Rudolf von Jhering
when he wrote in opposition to the positive codification of German law. Jhering had
a simple message: ‘a nation’s law, like its language and other cultural attributes, is an
unconscious emanation of the volksgeist, the “genius” of its people.’44 There is also a
sociological dimension to this discourse, exemplified by Eugen Erhlich’s willingness to
accept as law not just legal provisions meeting Hart’s ‘legal recognition’ attributes but
all forms of social ordering.45 Yet, as colonialism raged, these non-positivist viewpoints
were consigned to ‘the long-exploded Law of Nature in which no scientific jurist believes
anymore’.46

5. ENDURING CUSTOM IN THE AGE OF GLOBALISATION
The impact of Hartian positivism, notwithstanding African customary law, is not dead
yet. It has simply not yielded to the hegemony of unitary legal theory. Evidence of its
durability abounds, for example, in the law and development literature. Moreover, just
to mention a clear case in point, there is the idea that informality in the property and
land-holding system is antithetical to economic emancipation through capitalism. The
existence of plural informal legal orders (or legal pluralism) in such systems is therefore
equated with anarchy.47 But this theory notwithstanding, informal traditional landholding systems continue to regulate such relationships in different parts of Africa.
42

43
44

45

46
47

TW Bennett, ‘Re-Introducing African Customary Law to the South African Legal System’ (2009) 57
American Journal of Comparative Law 5; Marc Galanter, ‘Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering
and Indigenous Law’ (1985) 19 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 17.
Berkowitz (n 16) 614.
William Seagle, ‘Rudolf Von Jhering: Or Law as a Means to an End’ (1945) 13 University of Chicago Law
Review 74; see also Pierre Legrand, ‘European Legal Systems are Not Converging’ (1996) 45 International
and Comparative Law Quarterly 52; Gunther Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How
Unifying Law Ends up in New Divergences’ (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 11.
Eugen Ehrlich and Nathan Isaacs, ‘The Sociology of Law’ (1922) 36 Harvard Law Review 132; see also
Stefan Machura, ‘German Sociology of Law: A Case of Part Dependency’ (2012) 8 International Journal of
Law in Context 506 (stating: ‘Every German law student attending a lecture on the subject will invariably
hear about Professor Eugen Ehrlich, who lived in the most remote corner of the Austrian Empire, in a city
that now belongs to Ukraine. There, people of different ethnicity lived, entered contracts and regulated
claims according to their own customary rules. For them, Austrian codified law, the topic learnt by students
across the vast empire, was an irrelevant “dead” law. What mattered, according to Ehrlich, was the “living
law”, the rules people actually use’).
Ehrlich and Isaacs (n 45) 131.
Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else
(Basic Books, 2000) 27. See also Celestine Nyamu Musembi, ‘De Soto and Land Relations in Rural Africa:
Breathing Life into Dead Theories about Property Rights’ (2007) 28 Third World Quarterly 1460.
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Besides, globalisation and Twining’s shade of general jurisprudence are breathing
new life into that system of social regulation. Along similar lines, it has been argued,
there might be a big lesson for globalisation as presently understood to learn from
the literature on law and colonialism.48 Significantly, all over Africa, customary laws
continue to ‘govern civil and criminal affairs including family relations, traditional
authority, property rights, and succession’.49 In recent practice, rules of custom and local
legal processes are beginning to be favoured over and above formal legal institutions
conceived under liberal notions and positivist thinking in justice delivery mechanisms.50
That customary law remains a strong means of social regulation in Africa and
elsewhere in the Global South in spite of colonial and postcolonial influences51 confirms
an all too familiar fact: law is not totally abstract or acontextual. It must be understood
within a specific social and cultural setting. Theorising law in terms of legal doctrine,
meaning the ‘rules, principles, concepts … values and the modes of interpreting and
reasoning’52 of a hegemonic system, departs from this contextual approach. As Twining
asserts, globalisation and the pluralism that comes with it are challenging ‘standard,
taken-for-granted assumptions underlying [the] received tradition of academic law’.53
This challenge is significantly more crucial for subaltern legal systems, their
scholars and policy makers. It is not in doubt that the dominant legal ideas, systems
and institutions transplanted through colonialism in the subaltern regions have not
had the same impact in the postcolonial environments as they did for the regions from
which they originated.54 There could be a range of reasons for this. For one, it could be
that the receiving environments had neither equivalent institutional support as in the
colonising formations nor relevant contextual practices and were therefore ill suited to
the systems being transplanted. Yet this was apparently ignored in the hope perhaps that
with time the challenges of socially constructed peculiarities would be overcome. This
has not quite happened. Instead, mutual tension continues to define the relationship
48

49
50

51

52
53
54

Martin Chanock, Custom, and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia (Heinemann,
1998); Sally Engle Merry, ‘From Law and Colonialism to Law and Globalization’ (2003) 28 Law and Social
Inquiry 570.
Fenrich, Galizzi and Higgins (n 36) 2.
See Tanja Chopra, ‘Dispensing Elusive Justice: The Kenyan Judiciary amongst Pastoralist Societies’ (2010)
2 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 95; Peter Uvin and Charles Mironko, ‘Western and Local Approaches
to Justice in Rwanda’ (2003) 9 Global Governance 219; Phil Clark, ‘Hybridity, Holism, and “Traditional”
Justice: The Case of the GACACA Courts in Post-Genocide Rwanda’ (2007) 39 George Washington
International Law Review 765; Varun Gauri, ‘Customary Law and Economic Outcomes in Indonesia’ (2010)
2 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 75.
Uche Ewelukwa, ‘Posthumous Children, Hegemonic Human Rights, and the Dilemma of Reform:
Conversations across Cultures’ (2008) 19 Hastings Law Journal 211; TW Bennett, ‘The Compatibility
of African Customary Law and Human Rights’ (1991) Acta Juridica 18; Fidelis Okafor, ‘From Praxis to
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between the recipient systems and the traditional forms of social organisation postcolonisation.55 Globalisation and pluralism, it would seem, enjoin an understanding of
this phenomenon of tension as a pathway to producing more inclusive legal knowledge
useful to a diversity of social communities.
It could be argued that transplanted colonial law did not fail in colonised territories
since it was very useful in creating an environment conducive for the extraction of labour
and resources. The question could also be asked whether subaltern colonial societies
actually needed to have equivalent institutional and practical social support for law to
achieve its purpose. These two concerns are at the heart of Twining’s analysis as well as
this intervention. We have to note that a globalised understanding of legal knowledge,
as Twining pursues it, does not just seek to pluralise the idea of law but also welcomes
new theories alternative to the dominant liberal Euro-American traditions. Why are the
theories developed by ‘modern European sages’56 considered relevant to ‘other’ societies
(especially the subaltern) of which these Euro-sages ‘were empirically ignorant?’57
Twining seems to argue (and Chakrabarty supports) that because of globalisation or
pluralism it might be time for practitioners of the marginalised legal systems to ‘once
again return the gaze’.58
But they cannot return the gaze if all they ever do is react to or reproduce the same
theories developed in Europe and elsewhere in the West. It is therefore useful to recognise
that while the law under conditions of violence and physical oppression seemed to have
aided the realisation of colonial goals, this sense of order completely unravelled once
colonialism ended. Why did this happen even when it was the case that the local elite that
took over power in the post-colony only increased law’s violence as a tool of oppression?
The answer to this question could very well lie in the differing understandings of the role
of law in the colony on the one hand and the post-colony on the other. It has been argued
that colonial/imperial power provided only the scripts for governance.59 It was more a
rule by law than of law; not only was it a stranger to the idea of rights but in addition its
pretension to separation of powers and decentralisation only masked the fact that the
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centralised nature of colonial state power greatly minimised the possibility of even the
mildest risk.60
On the contrary, law had a different justification in the postcolonial subaltern
state. At least in theory, and unlike during colonialism, law’s justification thereafter
transcended the mere objective of resource and labour extraction.61 In the postcolonial
context, it needed to be more development-centred and also connected to the question
of fundamental rights; none of which was the case in the prior era as earlier argued. Law
also had to become useful in managing multiple layers of ethnic, religious and other
frictions arising primarily from the centralised nature of colonial power. How possible
was it then that these altered objectives of the law could be realised when its rationale
had changed in the postcolonial setting at the same time that the undergirding legal
institutions operating this altered understanding remained rooted in the dominant
colonial ideology?
To further explain this point, it is particularly important to borrow the parallel
that is drawn between states where colonialism had been very intense and those states
where it was less so. While in the former states colonialism led to the transplantation of
legal ideas and significant displacement of the traditional forms of order and dispute
resolution,62 in the latter states, some effort was made to retain those local forms of
order and dispute management. This difference would seem to have impacted the role of
law in the postcolonial developmental experience.
By way of illustration, Botswana has been put forward as one such state where the
‘effect of British colonialism … was minimal, and did not destroy inclusive pre-colonial
institutions’.63 It is often projected as an African success story and by some accounts
was the ‘fastest growing country in the world’ from 1965 to 1995.64 This contrasts
sharply with the experience of other contiguous former British African post-colonies
like Zambia and Zimbabwe.65 When matched against Botswana, these latter countries
hardly come up to scratch.
60
61

62
63
64
65

Ibid.
Some scholars have paid attention to how colonialism transformed the developmental trajectories
of nearly all regions of the world. ‘They divide colonialism into two broad categories – settlement and
extractive. Settlement colonies were created in areas with relatively benign disease environments yet
without large indigenous populations. According to these authors, because settlers both demanded and
helped to construct institutions that protected property rights, settlement colonies had relative effective
legal systems, institutions that persisted and thereby benefited postcolonial development. Alternatively,
where large-scale European settlement did not occur, colonial state officials were not constrained by
European settlers, focused simply on expropriating wealth from the colonised, and therefore failed to
provide the same legal protection of property as in settler colonies.’ See Matthew Lange, ‘British Colonial
Legacies and Political Development’ (2004) 32 World Development 905; Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson
and James Robinson, ‘Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation’ (2001)
91 American Economic Review 1369.
Moore (n 24) 17.
Scott Beaulier, ‘Explaining Botswana’s Success: The Critical Role of Post-Colonial Policy’ (2003–4) 23 Cato
Journal 231.
Ibid.
Ibid, 232.

560

Transnational Legal Theory

Some scholars have argued that the apparent disparity between these countries in
developmental terms can be explained in part by the intensity of colonial rule and the
reasoning behind its legal and institutional platform.66 While Botswana was a settler
colony, the other two were basically extractive. Law was used in a fashion that suited
specific colonial agendas. While in extractive colonies the objective was principally
‘to expropriate rents as quickly as possible rather than thinking of the long run’,67 in
settler colonies, the colonial powers had more long-term goals. This had implications
for the application of the law as a neo-liberal idea as well as the basic theoretical planks
supporting it. Sadly, the particular formulation of law, in its extractive incarnation, has
persisted well beyond colonialism and with mixed, mostly less than positive, results for
the postcolonial subaltern state.
There is therefore a growing recognition that the Eurocentric conception of legal
knowledge and theory is open to critique, and this has been noticeable in the legal
scholarship from subaltern legal traditions.68 In the area of constitutional law, a recently
published edited volume was devoted to answering the question whether the time had
come for the development of a constitutional theory of the Global South in general.69
In Africa, Shivji argues that the continent-wide liberal democracy and the constitutional
order upon which it is based have become far too fragile and unsustainable.70 Instead,
he suggests that Africa needs to ‘construct a political and constitutional order rooted
in alternative forms of state and democracy based on popular livelihoods, popular
participation and popular power’.71 This argument has also been extended to the
human rights field. One scholar suggests that in order to promote local capacity for
improved human rights conditions in Africa, for example, the process ‘must build on
what actually exists on the ground because attempting to impose norms and models
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developed elsewhere is both objectionable as a colonial exercise in cultural imperialism,
and unlikely to be workable in a sustainable manner in practice’.72

6. GLOBALISED LEGAL THEORY AND THE SUBALTERN CHALLENGE
Based on a close reading of the interaction between the dominant Euro-American legal
tradition and the subaltern systems upon which that tradition was imposed through
colonialism, two major propositions can be presented. One is that this dominant legal
academic discourse, according to Twining, ‘has tended to be ignorant, even ethnocentric,
about other legal traditions and belief systems’.73 Second, it is obviously not in doubt
that the theories of this dominant tradition (and this is not discounting its merits) have
not quite served the legal needs of subaltern societies and is literally facing a push-back
within the context of globalisation, multiculturalism and pluralism.74 In some instances,
those who practise the traditions of marginalised legal systems are bearding the lion of
unitary legal production in its den.75 The question that arises then is how this evidence
can inform legal theory and scholarship in the subaltern regions going forward. Twining
asserts that as the legal discipline becomes more cosmopolitan, there is a need for scholars from the dominant traditions to ‘become better acquainted with the leading thinkers
and salient ideas and controversies in other legal traditions and to extend [the] orthodox
canon of juristic texts’.76
But while this suggestion might be a useful one, it has to be placed in its correct
context. The marginalisation of non-Western legal ideas is not so much due to the failure
of the Western legal establishment to recognise those subaltern paradigms. To be sure,
my critique of this marginalisation is in no way intended to question the usefulness
of Western ideas of law to the West. Those ideas have served the West to a great extent
as Western modernity has been built essentially on those theoretical formulations.
My concern is how and to what extent this essentially Western knowledge could be
adapted to subaltern settings in such a way that other non-Western notions of law are
72
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strengthened rather than erased. Twining makes a similar point when he asserts that
as cosmopolitanism pushes the boundaries of law as a discipline, ‘we need to be better
acquainted with the leading thinkers and salient ideas and controversies in other legal
traditions and to extend our orthodox canon of juristic texts’.77 This places the ball in
the court of subaltern thinkers and scholars to show the ‘ideas and controversies’ of their
legal systems at the theoretical level.
They seem not to have done so in my view, for two main reasons. The first reason
is that Southern scholars tend mostly to react to knowledge produced by the dominant
culture, either because this is the only course open in the circumstances78 or because
such liberal ideas are ‘impossible to think of anywhere in the world without invoking
certain categories and concepts, the genealogies of which go deep into the intellectual
and even theological traditions of Europe’.79 The second reason is that there seems to be
a mismatch between knowledge produced in the Global South and the actual practices
of their societies in contrast to the synergy that seems to exist between the two, that is,
knowledge and practice, in the West. I will discuss these factors in sequence.
There is some evidence in the literature of a tendency for Southern (subaltern)
scholars to only react to or apply theoretical knowledge from the dominant tradition. In
1993, for example, the volume Nigerian Essays in Jurisprudence edited by TO Elias and
MI Jegede was published. It was intended, as one of the editors stated, to ‘put forward
… ideas and thoughts on jurisprudence and legal theory as … [a] contribution to the
current problems in law and action for the world’.80 Two contributions from that volume
are particularly relevant to the claims I make. First is Elias’s ‘Legal Theory: A Nigerian
Perspective’81 and, second, Chukwurah’s ‘Reflections on the Crises in Jurisprudence in
Nigeria’.82 Though introduced as a Nigerian perspective, Elias’s contribution turned out
to be anything but. Every single idea discussed came from the dominant legal tradition
of Europe, including Salmond on Jurisprudence,83 Dicey on the rule of law,84 as well
as Austin85 and Duguit86 on the definition of law. The rest consisted of a sprinkling
of English and Nigerian cases that supplied little evidence of the advertised ‘Nigerian
perspective’.
Chukwurah’s contribution followed a similar trajectory even when it was more
critical of the impact of foreign or received knowledge on the country’s legal identity.
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However, his entire analysis of this apparent loss of legal identity then rested on the ideas
of Frederick Charles Von Savigny, the historical school of jurisprudence and in particular
the concept of the Volksgeist. He asserted that the idea of the Volksgeist ‘is readily
understandable to any people involved in the political struggle for national rediscovery
or self-determination, especially after a lengthy spell of foreign colonial tutelage which
… creates [a] crisis of identity for the legal order of … colonial peoples’.87
More recently, Idowu sought to interrogate the ways in which the historical and
cultural heritage of Africa is reproduced, projected and represented in contemporary
philosophical disquisition.88 He first noted responses to the ‘unrepresentative’ nature
of the import and substance of African theory of law in general jurisprudence and
argued that ‘beneath the absence of an Afrocentric approach in mainstream, general
jurisprudence is the view that mainstream jurisprudence subscribes to a Eurocentric
historiography defined essentially in skeptical and racial terms’.89 In addition to an
admirable effort to unearth what this Afrocentric contribution to general jurisprudence
could be, Idowu’s analysis quickly dissolved into a response to David Hume and Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel on their views of Africans as a people, which, Idowu says, are
coloured by ‘racial prejudice’.90 Similar to this is the great intellectual ink expended by
three African scholars on the impact of legal positivism on African legal tradition that
dwelt on elements of legal positivist theory as understood from the writings of Western
scholars including Thomas Hobbes, John Austin and HLA Hart.91
The second factor is that there is an apparent disconnect between ideas generated in
the South and the social and political practices of these ideas within that environment.
While it is evident that the socio-political practices of the West enabling their prosperity
were substantially based on the knowledge produced by their major theorists and
thinkers,92 the same, it seems, may not be said of the Global South. When not reacting to
the dominant theoretical ideas,93 subaltern thinkers seem to run on empty because there
is little linkage (if at all) between their theorising and the actual practices of their social
and political systems. This is a major challenge.
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There is apparently no shortage of authentic and relevant theory and knowledge
that could serve the developmental needs of the Global South produced by Southern
scholars.94 It is less clear how many of those ideas actually inform public policy at official
and unofficial levels in those regions. As such, to earn their stripes, in my view, scholars
from the Global South would do well to impress their theories on policies that will produce
prosperity for their regions rather than only react to dominant ideas or seek validation
from the traditions they criticise. This is at the level of producing useful, fit-for-purpose
legal knowledge. However, its success is not solely dependent on the practices of the
scholars. Southern policy makers must also be willing to apply the knowledge produced
to drive effective public policy. Therefore, there would have to be synergy between the
knowledge produced and sound practices and results on the ground.
But as important as it is to generate alternative theoretical paradigms, this will still
be insufficient unless such knowledge is diffused through education and practice. Such
knowledge must be sold on its own merits and worth, and not out of concern for its
source. This makes the task of teaching, sharing and embedding these alternatives in
the legal and political processes of the Global South equally as crucial. The construction
and dissemination of legal theory based on alternative knowledge must as such form
the fulcrum of legal education in the Global South. If the argument is that subaltern
justice systems would better serve the environments that practise them, this would have
to be adequately theorised and the utility of those systems exemplified in practical terms.
This follows Twining’s counsel ‘not [to] abandon our heritage, but rather [to] set our
scholarship in a global context’.95 If we are talking about customary law, for example, it
would no longer be sufficient to simply say ‘this is how we lived’. It must be shown how
its practice advances development and ameliorates human suffering.

7. CONCLUSION
This essay sees possibilities for the pluralisation and globalisation of legal theory from
the perspective of William Twining’s monograph on Globalisation and Legal Scholarship. As globalisation furthers transnational interaction in ways that were not imaginable
just a few decades ago, Twining suggests that its impact is pushing the boundaries of
Western-inspired dominant legal thought towards the recognition of diversity in the
normative sources of law. I have argued that Twining’s thinking and insights similar to
his are reviving interest in the legal knowledge systems and institutions of subaltern territories upon which the dominant Western notions were imposed through colonialism.
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I looked at previous attempts to universalise legal theory through the writings of
major Western legal theorists and thinkers. I noted how they did this in a fashion that
clearly marginalised and subordinated non-Western understandings and ideas of law.
Yet, the very concept of law and its socio-political characteristics are still essentially
contested. This is as much the case in the West as in previously colonised subaltern
regions of the world. In the latter territories, law’s positivist incarnation has apparently
not been as effective as in the colonising societies from which its concepts and theory
were transplanted.
Borrowing from Twining’s insights, I have argued that globalisation and pluralism
as contemporary ideas are offering an opportunity to marginalised or subaltern legal
systems to contribute towards the development of a legal theory which accounts for
a diversity of traditions. But in utilising this opportunity, it has been suggested that
scholars from the regions where the subaltern traditions are still very much in practice
must move away from a place of reaction to a place of agency. In constructing theory
from the standpoint of the subaltern systems, not only would it be required that
specific theoretical ideas be placed on the table, but they must also be demonstrably fit
for purpose in practice. It should be clear how the legal knowledge generated in those
systems informs social and political policy choices as well as advances progress in those
regions. Finally, such alternative knowledge must also provide the foundation for legal
education in those regions.

